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  Anti-individualism and privileged self-knowledge may be 
incompatible if the attempt to hold both has the absurd 
consequence that one could know a priori propositions that are 
knowable only empirically. This would be so if such an attempt 
entailed that one could know a priori both the contents of one's 
own thoughts and the anti-individualistic entailments from those 
thought-contents to the world. For then one could also come to 
know a priori (by simple deduction) the empirical conditions 
entailed by one's thoughts. But I shall argue that there is no 
construal of 'a priori knowledge' that could be used to raise an 
incompatibilist objection of this sort.  
  Note first that knowledge of one's own thought-contents 
would not count as a priori according to the usual criteria for 
knowledge of this kind.
1 Surely, then, incompatibilists are using 
this term to refer to some other, stipulatively defined, 
epistemic property. But could this be, as suggested by McKinsey 
(1991: 9), the property of being knowable 'just by thinking' or 
                         
     
1I take the rationalist, Kantian and empiricist criteria of 
aprioricity to be, respectively, knowledge attainable by reason 
alone, knowledge independent of all experience (where 
propositions about the contents of one's own mental states are 
empirical propositions of inner sense), and knowledge of 
conceptual, logical, or mathematical truths.  'from the armchair'? Certainly not if these were metaphors for 
knowledge attainable on the basis of reason alone, since self-
knowledge would fail to come out a priori in this sense. And 
exactly the same would happen if the property were that of being 
knowable by inference, since, according to a common intuition, 
self-knowledge is noninferential. 
  But suppose 'a priori' were defined as the property of 
being knowable without experience
2 -- where 'experience' is 
construed narrowly in order to get knowledge of the contents of 
one's thoughts to come out as nonempirical.
3 Since 
incompatibilists would now be departing from standard 
construals, we might ask: How, given anti-individualism and 
privileged self-knowledge, could a person (say, Oscar) know 
nonempirically both the anti-individualistic entailments from 
his thought-contents to the world, and his thought-contents?  
                         
     
2This has a number of different uses, and seems more 
suitable for the problem incompatibilists wish to raise -- viz., 
that of someone's being able to know that water exists from 
premisses knowable entirely by introspection or by philosophical 
argument. McKinsey (1991: 9), for instance, defines 'a priori' 
as knowledge attainable without 'launching an empirical 
investigation or making any assumptions about the empirical 
world', and Boghossian (1997: 161 and ff.) uses 'knowable a 
priori' and 'knowable without the benefit of empirical 
investigation' interchangeably.  
     
3Note that Burge (1995: 272) is committed to such a 
construal of experience, for he takes a justification to be a 
priori or nonempirical '... if its justificational force is in 
no way constituted or enhanced by reference to or reliance on 
the specifics of some range of sense experiences or perceptual 
beliefs'.    Arguably, beliefs about such entailments are attainable by 
thought experiments (philosophical arguments, etc.), and beliefs 
about one's own thought-contents, by a process we may call 
'introspection'. But if this is what incompatibilists mean by 
'nonempirical', their intended reductio of anti-individualism 
and privileged self-knowledge would, of course, be an 
equivocation.
4 Yet there would be no equivocation if 'a priori' 
were defined as the disjunctive property of being knowable 
either by thought experiments or by introspection. For then each 
disjunct would be a type of knowledge attainable without 
empirical investigation, and when predicated of the premisses of 
Oscar's reasoning, they would each come out true because a 
different disjunct obtains. But such a property would make the 
incompatibilist argument invalid, since there is no plausible 
closure principle allowing the transmission of epistemic status 
from premisses to conclusion. For imagine that I first introduce 
a stipulatively defined epistemic property, say 
'a priori+'= knowable either conceptually or directly. 
 
I claim then to know a priori+ that if I am seeing only a tree, 
then I am not seeing a horse, for this is available to me 
                         
     
4Miller (1997) has recently held that incompatibilists are 
equivocating, but as shown here, their argument could be 
construed in a way that avoids that fallacy. conceptually. Furthermore, being a direct realist, I claim to 
know a priori+ that I am seeing only a tree, for this is 
available to me directly. (Note that each premiss comes out a 
priori+ because a different disjunct of my stipulated property 
obtains.) However, I cannot claim to know a priori+ that I am 
not seeing a horse, since this conclusion is not available to me 
either conceptually or directly, but inferentially. Thus closure 
fails here. But, in exactly the same way, it fails in Oscar's 
argument, when the property of being knowable without empirical 
investigation is cashed out as the disjunctive property of being 
knowable either by thought experiment or by introspection. 
  To avoid a failure of closure, incompatibilists might now 
attempt to construe 'a priori' as the property of being knowable 
either by thought experiments, introspection, or inference. Yet 
this construal is unavailable to them, and it would generate no 
problem for anti-individualism. For note, first, what is 
entailed by the incompatibilists' claim that Oscar could come to 
know anti-individualism by running standard thought experiments: 
If this were so, then Oscar could know anti-individualism only 
empirically, since to run his experiments some empirical 
beliefs, as well as nondeductive inference, must be available to 
him. He must have at least some empirical beliefs, because he 
needs to specify the relevant background conditions against 
which he is to test whether content supervenes locally. And, naturally, providing adequate descriptions of the relevant 
states of affairs in the actual and possible worlds requires 
empirical beliefs concerning molecule-per-molecule replicas, 
planets, natural kinds, etc.
5  
  On the other hand, suppose that Oscar has adequately set 
out a twin-earth case. Would he then be in a position to 
conclude, by straightforward deduction, that content does not 
supervene locally? Surely not, since he would then be confronted 
by contradictory intuitions, neither of which is entailed by the 
data the imagined state of affairs makes available.
6 For from 
those data, Oscar could conclude, with the individualist, that 
when he and his twin sincerely utter 'Water is wet', their 
thoughts have the same content (that is, that content supervenes 
locally) or, with the anti-individualist, that they do not. How, 
then, does the anti-individualist use the thought experiments to 
reach his conclusion? He sets out a case, reflects upon actual 
(observed) ascriptions of meaning and content, compares 
competing explanations of these ordinary practices, and finally 
                         
     
5 
Otherwise, how could Oscar work out the ceteris paribus 
conditions relevant to the phenomenon he wishes to test? See K. 
Wilkes (1988). 
     
6The anti-individualist conclusion does not, of course, 
follow from a twin-earth or an 'arthritis' case, unless some 
assumptions -- concerning, for instance, conditions for sameness 
and difference in content, and indexicality -- are made. See B. 
Loar (1988), and E. Sosa (1993). suggests that the hypothesis that best explains the imagined 
state of affairs is that content does not supervene locally.
7 It 
follows that if Oscar is to learn anti-individualism by running 
twin-earth cases, some empirical beliefs and nondeductive 
inference must be available to him. 
  Once we acknowledge that standard anti-individualist 
thought experiments require both background empirical beliefs 
and inference, then what incompatibilists imagine to be a 
reductio is in fact only that a person could come to know 
empirical propositions by deductive and nondeductive inference 
from the contents of his mind: his perceptual, sensory and 
doxastic states, to which he has privileged access.  
  Yet this seems very plausible and consistent with many 
empiricist attempts to explain knowledge of empirical 
propositions. Don't sense-datum theorists (both indirect 
realists and phenomenalists)
8 explain it by invoking knowledge of 
our mental states and inference? And aren't those theorists 
empiricists? Note that, if we cash out the incompatibilists' 'a 
priori' as the property of being knowable either by thought 
                         
     
7 
Oscar could say that, ordinarily, we invoke that-clauses to 
identify propositional-attitude content, take difference in 
their truth-conditions to be sufficient for difference in their 
content, do not ascribe false beliefs to others unless we have 
good reasons for it, etc. Note that his claims supporting anti-
individualism would then be empirical claims. 
     
8For instance, G.E. Moore and C.I. Lewis. experiments, introspection, or inference, then sense-datum 
theories would have to be construed as claiming that we have 'a 
priori' knowledge of empirical propositions. But now, surely, 
something has gone wrong with the stipulation! 
  It appears, then, that the anti-individualist is in the 
clear: for of the various possible ways of construing 'a priori' 
in the incompatibilist argument, it is now plain that each 
generates a problem for the proposed reductio.
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9Thanks to Jonathan Adler, Brian Loar, Stephen Schiffer, 
Gary Seay, and Ernest Sosa for criticisms on an earlier draft, 
and to Umit Yalcin for helpful discussions of these matters. REFERENCES 
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